We present a structural model of political advertising in equilibrium. Candidates choose advertising across media markets in order to maximize the probability of winning the national election. The voter model takes the form of an aggregate random coefficients discrete choice model in which advertising affects a voter's incentive to vote for either candidate or not to vote at all. We estimate the model using detailed advertising and voting data from the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections.
We use the model to conduct a counterfactual in which we eliminate the Electoral College, and consider a direct national vote. Changing the structure of the electoral process alters candidates' marginal incentives to advertise in a given market. This leads to a new equilibrium allocation of advertising and potentially a new voting outcome. Furthermore, our model could be used for other counterfactuals, such as considering the effects of 3rd-party candidates or certain campaign finance reforms, and could be applied or extended to races for other offices (e.g. house, senate or gubernatorial) or the primaries. This paper reexamines the question of whether brand extension can serve as a signal of product quality. Wernerfelt's (1988) paper suggested it can, but he assumed that brand extension costs more than introducing a new brand. We ask to what extent his argument survives dropping this assumption. Even though his equilibrium can still exist as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the modified model, it is not the only one. We exhibit a pooling equilibrium in which brand extension does not signal product quality, and argue that on several criteria the pooling equilibrium is more compelling than Wernerfelt's separating equilibrium. In particular, only the pooling equilibrium exists robustly under "empirically justified" offequilibrium beliefs. If introducing a new brand costs even infinitesimally more than brand extension, then brand extension can be a signal of product quality under empirical off-equilibrium beliefs if and only if old and new products' qualities are correlated and consumers identify with brands and not the firm behind the brands. We conclude the paper with a discussion of how our results relate to the behavioral literature on brand extensions and managerial practice. We estimate a model of consumer plan choice, usage, and learning in cellular-phone services on a detailed panel data set of individual bills. Our model allows consumers to learn about how much they value cellular services. We infer consumers' predictions of their future cellular usage from plan choices, and compare these predictions to actual usage. A consumer's value for cellular services contains a permanent consumer specific element and a monthly idiosyncratic element. We find that on average consumers underestimate their permanent type (mean bias), underestimate their own uncertainty about their permanent type (overconfidence), and underestimate the monthly variation (projection bias) in their taste for usage. Our paper also advances structural modeling of demand in situations where multipart tariffs induce marginal price uncertainty at the time consumers make consumption choices. Mortgage loans are leading examples of transactions where experts on one side of the market take advantage of consumers' lack of knowledge and experience. We study the compensation that borrowers pay to mortgage brokers for assistance from application to closing. Two findings support the conclusion that confused borrowers overpay for brokers' services: (1) A model of effective shopping shows that borrowers sacrifice at least $1,000 by shopping from too few brokers. (2) Borrowers who compensate their brokers with both cash and a commission from the lender pay twice as much as similar borrowers who pay no cash. 
Constrained Optimization Approaches to Estimation of Structural Models
Che-Lin Su (Chicago) and Kenneth L. Judd (Hoover Institution)
Estimation of structural models is often viewed as computationally difficult. This impression is partly due to a focus on the Nested Fixed-Point (NFXP) approach. We present a direct optimization approach to the general problem and show that it is significantly faster than the NFXP approach when applied to the canonical Zurcher bus repair model. The nested-type of approach is inappropriate for estimating games with multiple equilibria since it requires finding all Nash equilibria of a game for each parameter vector considered in order to calculate the likelihood value at that given parameter vector. Even if one can solve for all the equilibria for every guess of structural parameters, the resulting likelihood function can be nonsmooth or even discontinuous, which makes the outer-loop optimization problem extremely difficult. We formulate the estimation of games as a constrained optimization problem that is qualitatively no more difficult to solve than standard maximum likelihood problems. The direct optimization approach is also applicable to other structural estimation methods such as the methods of moments, and also allows one to use computationally intensive bootstrap methods to calculate inference. We show how to use micro-level survey data from a tracking study on brand awareness in conjunction with data on sales and advertising expenditures to improve the specification, estimation, and interpretation of aggregate discrete choice models of demand. In a departure from the commonly made full information assumption, we incorporate limited information in the form of choice sets to reflect the fact that consumers may not be aware of all available brands at purchase time. We derive theoretically and show empirically that both the estimated brand constants and the price coefficient are biased downward when consumer heterogeneity in choice sets is ignored. These biased estimates lead to costly mistakes in firms' price setting.
In addition, the tracking data allow us to identify separately two processes by which advertising influences market shares. We find that advertising has a direct effect on brand awareness (inclusion in choice set) in addition to its effect on consumer preferences (increase in utility). This improved understanding of how advertising works enhances our ability to make policy recommendations. Many papers estimate demand in discrete choice settings using the inversion from Berry (1994) to control for unobserved product quality and its correlation with price. This approach requires utility to be additively separable in the unobserved factor, a restriction hard to motivate theoretically. We develop an estimator for a model with interactions between observed and unobserved product attributes. We show that the standard conditional moment restrictions do not generally suffice for identification. We supplement these moments with new "control function" moments using price controls originally proposed in Petrin and Train (2010) and Kim and Petrin (2010a) , and provide conditions under which the demand parameters are identified. A major advantage of our setup is it does not require the strong control function conditions used in Bajari and Benkard (2003) and Kim and Petrin (2010a) , who require the controls to be one-to-one functions with unobserved factors and fully independent of observed factors. We run several monte carlos that show the approach works when the standard IV approaches fail because of non-separability. We also test and reject additive separability in the original Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) automobile data, and we show that demand becomes significantly more elastic when the correction is applied. 
